This study aims to examine and analyze the effect of the Investment Opportunity Set (IOS) on the corporation funding policies and also finds out whether or not the institutional ownership moderates the role of family ownership on IOS and company funding policies. The population includes all go-public companies listed on the IDX over the period 2008-2016. The sampling technique used was purposive sampling method. The processing data used regression equations with panel data models and Eviews analysis tools. The results show that IOS had a negative effect on the funding policies. This makes the company with a lower debt to equity ratio on its capital structure policy to use the equity financing to reduce the agency problems. Institutional ownership moderates the influence of IOS on the funding policies. This proves that the institutional ownership balances need to replace the role of debt in monitoring the managers and reducing the agency problems in the company. The family ownership does not moderate the influence of IOS on the funding policies because in the ownership, the family tends to take opportunities for the personal interests and form a weak ownership structure so that the agency problems rises and disrupts the company performance.

The two-tier board system practiced in Indonesia provides greater opportunity for the majority shareholders to place representative on board which may expropriate interest of minority share-holders and increase information asymmetry. This study looks at the influence of family ownership on firm’s performance, by differentiating the influence of family ownership from family involvement in companies listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange. Family ownership is measured based on family’s equity ownership in the firm and family’s involvement. This study explores family in-volvement in threefold: involvement in the board of commissioners, involvement in the board of directors and involvement in both boards. Firm performance is measured based on Value Added Intellectual Coefficient (VAIC) which comprises of capital employed efficiency, human capital efficiency, and structural capital efficiency. Data was collected for a period of three years from 2007 to 2009 on 155 firms which were identified as family firms. The findings show that family ownership has a positive influence on firm performance. Family involvement, however, shows mixed results. Family involvement in the board of commissioners has a positive but insignificant influence on firm’s performance. Family involvement in the board of directors has a negative influence on firm’s performance. Family involvement in both boards has a positive influence on firm performance. The findings suggest that family involvement in both boards creates a balance between the supervisory function and the management function, thus resulting in a more effective monitoring of firm’s management.

This research aimed to examine the association between board of directors’ characteristics as a composite measure, the performance of companies in Jordan and the influence of family ownership on this association. Using data on industrial companies indexed on the Amman Stock Exchange (ASE) from 2013 to 2017, a positive association between board characteristics and company performance was found, indicating that higher board effectiveness is associated with more effective monitoring of management behavior. In addition, the association between board characteristics and company performance was strong when there was an interaction with family ownership, as companies with boards with family members achieve higher performance than companies with boards run by external directors. The study findings could be useful to all regulators seeking to improve the quality of monitoring mechanism practices, especially in emerging economies.