Driven by the robust growth of ecommerce and the ongoing upgrading of consumer demand structures, the development and strategic layout of private store brands by ecommerce platforms have emerged as a key development trend in the global retail industry. This industrial shift not only grants platforms stronger channel bargaining power and wider profit margins, but also fundamentally reconstructs the traditional channel power structure that was long dominated by national brand manufacturers. Against this backdrop, this study takes a two-tier supply chain consisting of a national brand manufacturer and an ecommerce platform as the research object. Under the channel power structure where the ecommerce platform serves as the leader in the Stackelberg game, we build game models integrating the fairness preference behaviors of supply chain members, to systematically explore the heterogeneous effects of brand advantage, store brand quality perception, and fairness concerns on the pricing strategies and revenue performance of all supply chain participants. The empirical results indicate that in the fairness neutrality scenario, the ecommerce platform’s leadership can significantly boost the revenue of all supply chain members. However, the fairness concerns of the national brand manufacturer are not always conducive to its own benefits, and may even impair the ecommerce platform’s revenue. When the commission rate exceeds a specific critical threshold, overemphasis on fairness may even trigger a drop in the manufacturer’s own revenue. For the ecommerce platform, the revenue contribution of its fairness concern behaviors is heavily dependent on the level of the commission rate, and only exerts a positive promotion effect in the high commission rate scenario. In addition, under the ecommerce platform’s leadership, the increase of the commission rate has a positive driving effect on the retail prices of both national brand and store brand products, while the promotion effect of brand advantage on product quality is restricted by specific parameter thresholds. This study enriches the comparative research on store brand supply chain management under different channel power structures, extends the behavioral operation theory of supply chain members with fairness preference, and offers a new analytical perspective for investigating the core operational decision-making mechanisms of ecommerce supply chains.

Optimizing the distribution of perishable emergency materials in the aftermath of sudden disasters holds significant theoretical and practical value. This paper begins by defining the freshness of perishable emergency materials and develops a continuous piecewise function to describe the changes in quality and quantity of these materials at different time stages. Additionally, it considers distinct delivery requirements for each demand point regarding the same perishable emergency materials. Under the minimum freshness constraint, a vehicle distribution optimization model is established for perishable emergency materials, considering multiple distribution centers and multiple vehicles. Depending on whether the distribution center has an adequate number of vehicles, the solution can be classified into three scenarios. In the case of insufficient total emergency supplies but sufficient vehicles, an accurate algorithm is designed to address the model. Alternatively, when both the total emergency supplies and vehicles are insufficient, an approximate algorithm is developed to solve the model. Finally, when the total quantity of perishable emergency materials is inadequate, and some vehicles are sufficient while others are not, the problem is transformed into one of the first two situations to find a solution. To validate the accuracy of the model and the effectiveness of the algorithm, an analysis is conducted using the flood-stricken area in Shouguang, Shandong as a case study.

Under the rapid development of the global economy, environmental pollution has intensified significantly. The evolving external environment presents both opportunities and challenges to traditional supply chains. As an innovative management philosophy and practical approach, the green supply chain has rapidly become an integral component of corporate sustainable development strategies. However, the transition from traditional supply chain to green supply chain necessitates effective collaboration and coordination among supply chain members. Contractual coordination has therefore emerged as an effective methodology to enhance operational efficiency and profitability across supply chain participants. To investigate the impact of various coordination mechanisms on the optimal decision-making of green supply chains, we construct a Stackelberg game model involving bilateral green investments by both manufacturer and retailer within a two-echelon green supply chain system. Considering the bilateral green efforts from both manufacturer and retailer, we comparatively analyze game equilibrium solutions under three scenarios: non-coordination, cost-sharing contract coordination, and two-part contract coordination. Specifically，we examine how these coordination mechanisms influence pricing strategies, green investment levels, and profit distributions within the supply chain network. Finally, the results are validated and illustrated using numerical simulation. It is discovered that 1) the cost-sharing contract cannot simultaneously increase the Pareto improvement of producers' and retailers' revenues; 2) the cost-sharing contract cannot increase the social utility and additive greenness of products; however, it can improve the marketing effort; and 3) When retailers maintain an optimistic stance toward manufacturers' green initiatives, the two-part tariff contract enables concurrent Pareto improvements in both parties' profits while simultaneously enhancing product greenness, marketing efforts, and social welfare, thereby achieving efficient supply chain coordination.

In the domain of international construction projects, managing supply chains presents distinct challenges due to the intricate task of coordinating multiple stakeholders within diverse cultural, economic, and regulatory contexts. Prior research highlights the significance of incentive mechanisms and collaborative procurement practices, yet the effectiveness of these strategies in augmenting performance for international projects has not been extensively examined. This investigation explores the effects of financial and non-financial incentives on the performance of global construction projects, with a focus on the mediating role of cooperation. Data were gathered from Chinese international contractors and local suppliers and subsequently analyzed using Structural Equation Modeling. The results reveal two separate pathways of influence. Firstly, financial incentives exhibited substantial direct and indirect impacts on project performance; secondly, while non-financial incentives did not directly affect project performance, they significantly impacted cooperation levels, which in turn mediated the relationship between non-financial incentives and project performance. This study provides essential perspectives for managing international construction projects, emphasizing the critical need for the combined application of financial and non-financial incentives to foster cooperation and ultimately achieve superior project outcomes.