The 531 New Deal has gradually transitioned the photovoltaic market policy from industrial policy to competition policy. This paper considers the two policy orientations of the photovoltaic supply chain: industrial policy and competition policy. Based on differential game theory, the profit models of photovoltaic supply chain entities under the two policy orientations are constructed, and the optimal solutions of each model are solved. The research finds that policy guidance factors affect the strategic choices of photovoltaic supply chain entities; Compared to industrial policies, competition policy orientation can increase the profits of various entities in the photovoltaic supply chain to varying degrees.

With the annual promotion of the international “dual carbon” goals, countries attach great importance to the development and innovation of clean energy. The United States, Japan, and China have all created many policies for the research and market development of photovoltaic energy. This article incorporates market dynamic regulation capability into a two-dimensional system of government subsidy policies and photovoltaic revenue, constructs a three-dimensional dynamic nonlinear model based on market dynamic regulation capability, government subsidies, and enterprise revenue, and numerically simulates and analyzes the impact of parameter and initial value changes in the equation on enterprise revenue. The market dynamic regulation capability is obtained from Chaotic attractors and dynamic evolution graphs of the nonlinear evolution between government subsidies and corporate profits in different scenarios. Research has shown that: (1) Rapidly improving the dynamic regulation ability of the market cannot continuously increase the revenue of the photovoltaic industry; (2) The changes in market dynamics affect the dependence of enterprises on government subsidies; (3) The demand for government subsidies by enterprises gradually decreases with the increase of their own profits.

Introduce government competition policies and technological innovation efforts into the profit game model of the photovoltaic industry supply chain, establish two different supply chain profit models, and study the impact of government competition policies and manufacturers' technological innovation efforts on the profits of each manufacturer and the overall profit of the supply chain. Construct profit models in both competitive and cooperative situations, and empirically analyze the impact of government competition policies and manufacturers' technological innovation efforts on the optimal supply chain profits in both competitive and cooperative situations. Research has shown that: (1) government competition policies are conducive to promoting an increase in manufacturers' profits; (2) The increase in technological innovation efforts can quickly increase manufacturers' profits; (3) Compared to the cooperation situation, the profit of each manufacturer and the total profit of the entire supply chain are higher in the competitive situation.

From the perspective of carbon quota policy, we consider integrating carbon quota sharing contracts into the collaborative decision-making model of the photovoltaic industry chain and compare and explore the collaborative decision-making of the photovoltaic industry chain under decentralized decision-making and considering carbon quota sharing contracts. Research has found that carbon quota sharing contracts can effectively promote green innovation among the main body of the photovoltaic industry chain; In the case of carbon quota sharing contracts, the pricing between photovoltaic system suppliers and photovoltaic power plant enterprises is lower; Under the carbon quota sharing contract, the profits, and overall profits of each entity in the photovoltaic industry chain are better than the optimal profits under decentralized conditions.