As a supply chain integrator, a fourth party logistics (4PL) typically does not have its own logistics facilities, so the 4PL needs to match third party logistics (3PLs) and customers to meet customers' logistics service demands. An effective matching method can not only improve the efficiency of 4PL supply chain management, but also establish more long-term and stable cooperative relationships with customers and 3PLs. Therefore, we propose a novel two-sided logistics matching method considering the trading psychology and matching effort of matching subjects under the 4PL. First, based on considering the trading psychology, the concepts of blocking pair and stable matching are redefined. Then, based on the public values and matching effort of customers and 3PLs, the evaluation values of customers and 3PLs are calculated. And the trading possibilities of customers and 3PLs are calculated by considering the fairness threshold. Next, we consider different stable matching demands of customers and 3PLs and develop a bi-objective matching model to maximize the trading possibilities of both customers and 3PLs. Furthermore, the properties of the proposed method are discussed. Finally, a numerical example and comparison analysis are provided to prove the feasibility and effectiveness of the proposed method.

Reverse auction is an effective tool for a 4PL to purchase transportation services. This paper investigated a new transportation services procurement problem for 4PL, which involves three features: the 4PL’s loss-averse behavior, price and non-price attributes, and multiple transportation requests. An efficient multi-attribute multi-item reverse auction mechanism considering the 4PL ex-ante and ex-post satisfaction (EES-MMRA) is proposed to purchase transportation services for the 4PL. In the EES-MMRA, integrating the allocation rule with the 4PL ex-ante satisfaction, a 0-1 programming model is constructed to determine winning 3PLs and obtain efficient allocations. Then, a payment rule considering the 4PL ex-post satisfaction is established to ensure truthful bidding of 3PLs. And we discuss some desirable properties (e.g., incentive compatibility, individual rationality, efficiency, and budget balance properties) to justify the EES-MMRA mechanism, subsequently. Next, several numerical experiments are conducted to demonstrate the effectiveness and applicability of the EES-MMRA mechanism. Furthermore, sensitivity analysis presents the influences of the weights of the non-price attributes, risk attitude coefficients, and loss aversion coefficients. Finally, we conduct comparison analysis to show the advantages of the EES-MMRA mechanism over the known Vickrey–Clark–Groves (P-VCG) mechanism.