The present study explored the relationship between CEO duality and the scope of CER practices in the yearly reports of Jordanian industrial firms over the period 2009-2018 shaped by the board directors’ political links. To determine the amount of environmental data included in the firms’ yearly reports, the method of content analysis checklist was applied. CEO duality was chosen as an independent variable, which was measured by attributing a score to the existence/non-existence of CEO dual role, whilst the employed moderator variable was the political links and measured by attributing a score to the existence/non-existence of political links among the board directors of the investigated firms. Furthermore, to evaluate how the relationship between CEO duality and CER practices was influenced by political links, the statistical package for the social sciences (SPSS) and Hayes’ PROCESS macro were adopted. According to the results obtained, the above-mentioned relationship was substantially adversely impacted by political links. Such results could promote better corporate-stakeholder communication, enhancing stakeholders’ awareness of environmental responsibility in the context of Jordan as a developing nation. Therefore, the results have ramifications for the practices employed by firms to report on matters unrelated to finance.

The main purpose of this paper is to examine the effect of inside debt compensation on bank performance, and identify the determinants of inside debt compensation. Using a sample of thirty European Banks during the period of 2006-2011, this paper presents evidence to support the existing literature that states that debt-based compensations plans have a significant impact on banks’ performance. The results imply that banks rely more on a debt-based compensation as leverage increases. A positive association has also been documented between debt-based compensation usage and both CEO age and bank size. The human capital of CEOs has been found to be negatively related to debt-based compensation. The empirical findings show that there is a significant negative relationship between inside debt compensation and banks' performance. Specifically, CEOs paid with a higher level of inside debt compensation were more likely to engage in lower risk-seeking behavior, such as adopting more conservative policies and investment choices. Thus, inside debt compensation plans can influence the risk-taking of managers, which may have the potential to significantly affect bank performance. Generally, inside debt compensation can reduce risk-shifting problems and lead to behavior which positively impacts debt-holders, as less risk-taking can directly contribute to a lower probability of default. The findings of this paper present important implications for many interested parties throughout the European Union, such as regulators, investors, and standards setters, whose aim is to enhance the soundness of the banking sector.