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Growing Science » Tags cloud » Trade policy

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1.

Unilateral, bilateral, or tariff-free: How tariff structures affect competing manufacturers in a cross-border supply chain? Pages 1711-1728 PDF Download PDF

Authors: Tingru Zhang, Rong Zhang, Bin Liu

doi 10.5267/j.ijiec.2026.7.001

🔑 Keywords: Cross-border supply chain, Asymmetric tariffs, Trade policy, Pricing strategy, Game theory

Abstract:
To examine the impact of different tariff structures on cross-border supply chains and support multinational corporations in addressing trade frictions and policy formulation, this paper constructs a three-tier cross-border supply chain model comprising domestic suppliers, domestic manufacturers, and multinational manufacturers. It analyzes equilibrium decisions under tariff-free, unilateral tariff, and bilateral tariff scenarios. Using reverse induction, the optimal pricing and profits of supply chain members are determined, with a focus on analyzing the effects of key factors such as the tariff application stage, raw material costs, and market competition intensity. Findings reveal that tariffs influence upstream and downstream pricing through cost pass-through: when applied to final goods, suppliers gain bargaining power and raise wholesale prices; when applied to intermediate goods, suppliers are forced to lower prices to maintain sales volume. Manufacturers' selling prices and market demand are jointly regulated by cost and competition effects, exhibiting non-monotonic changes under bilateral tariffs that reflect the dynamic trade-off between cost-driven increases and demand contraction. Profit analysis indicates that when tariffs are applied to final goods, multinational manufacturers can pass on the tax burden by raising prices when raw material costs are low, potentially achieving higher profits than in a tariff-free scenario. When tariffs target intermediate goods, multinational manufacturers bear the brunt of the burden, exhibiting a “reverse pass-through” effect. Bilateral tariffs consistently represent a suboptimal choice for multinational manufacturers, demonstrating that retaliatory tariffs fail to improve their profitability. Under asymmetric tariff scenarios, the interaction between tariff intensity, costs, and competitive strength further influences corporate strategy choices.
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Journal: IJIEC | Year: 2026 | Volume: 17 | Issue: 4 | Views: 118

 
2.

Generalized game theoretic framework for manufacturer-intermediary-market systems with policy constraints Pages 535-546 PDF Download PDF

Authors: Yi Wang, Wenguang Tang

doi 10.5267/j.ijiec.2026.3.002

🔑 Keywords: Trade policy, Bargaining power, Entering time, Cournot competition game, Stackelberg competition game

Abstract:
Government trade policies aimed at maximizing economic returns have emerged as a key concern among both scholars and industry stakeholders. Export taxes and subsidies are typically the primary instruments employed. This paper examines optimal export policies for governments within a bilateral trade framework, analyzing both Cournot and Stackelberg competition models. Our model comprises two Manufacturers (Manufacturer 1 in Country A and Manufacturer 2 in Country B), two intermediaries (Intermediary I and II), and a third-Country consumer market. Manufacturer 1 exports to the third market via Intermediary I, while Manufacturer 2 exports via Intermediary II. Crucially, both Manufacturers compete directly within this third market. The analysis reveals that regardless of which export policies governments implement, the social welfare of Countries A and B is influenced not only by the bargaining power between enterprises and intermediaries, but also by the entry order into the competitive third market.
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Journal: IJIEC | Year: 2026 | Volume: 17 | Issue: 2 | Views: 198

 

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