Public-private cooperation is vital for emergency stocks, yet complex behavioral characteristics of governments and suppliers often affect system reliability. Existing research has mainly examined supplier loss aversion, with limited attention to government inequity aversion. This paper investigates how to strategically reserve and procure emergency supplies under the roles of supplier loss aversion and government inequity aversion. We develop an option contract-based emergency stockpiling model that incorporates a loss-averse supplier and an inequity-averse government. Moreover, comparisons between the decisions yield the boundary conditions for supplier understocking and overstocking. The conditions for humanitarian channel coordination under both disadvantageous and advantageous inequity aversion are derived, with some overlapping and others differing between both situations. A case study using laboratory simulations is conducted. The results indicate that higher loss aversion and optimism levels decrease the supplier's best reserve quantity; disadvantageous (advantageous) inequity aversion increases (reduces) the government's optimal purchase of physical options. The boundary conditions for supplier understocking and overstocking depend on the interaction between government inequity aversion and supplier loss aversion. Finally, some targeted managerial insights are proposed to coordinate the humanitarian supply chains, select appropriate suppliers, and evaluate the behavioral preferences of participating members.

With the rapid growth of e-commerce, platform-based financing in electronic business (EB) has emerged as an innovative solution for online retailers facing capital constraints. This study develops a Stackelberg game-theoretic framework to analyze strategic financing decisions in a two-tier e-commerce supply chain, where an electronic business platform (EBP) , as the leader, assumes leadership by setting financing interest rates, while a capital-constrained, loss-averse online retailer (LOR), as the follower, optimizes order quantities and financing participation under behavioral risk preferences. A hierarchical game-theoretic framework is established to examine strategic interactions between an EBP and a LOR, and the equilibrium outcomes are given. The model derives optimal decisions for both financing rates and ordering strategies. Results demonstrate that when the retailer's initial capital grows, their necessity for external financing diminishes correspondingly, leading to smaller order quantities due to reduced bankruptcy risk. Moreover, higher levels of loss aversion cause retailers to order less and avoid financing, reflecting risk-sensitive behavior. The study also presents comprehensive numerical analyses to explore additional managerial implications, offering insights into how capital availability and behavioral factors like loss aversion shape decision-making in EB financing environments.

This research examines the determinants of firms’ investment introducing a behavioral perspective that has received little attention in corporate finance literature. The following central hypothesis emerges from a set of recently developed theories: Investment decisions are influenced not only by their fundamentals but also depend on some other factors. One factor is the biasness of any CEO to their investment, biasness depends on the cognition and emotions, because some leaders use them as heuristic for the investment decision instead of fundamentals. This paper shows how CEO emotional bias (optimism, loss aversion and overconfidence) affects the investment decisions. The proposed model of this paper uses Bayesian Network Method to examine this relationship. Emotional bias has been measured by means of a questionnaire comprising several items. As for the selected sample, it has been composed of some 100 Tunisian executives. Our results have revealed that the behavioral analysis of investment decision implies leader affected by behavioral biases (optimism, loss aversion, and overconfidence) adjusts its investment choices based on their ability to assess alternatives (optimism and overconfidence) and risk perception (loss aversion) to create of shareholder value and ensure its place at the head of the management team.