The present study constructs a remanufacturing supply chain framework that encompasses both manufacturer and retailer. We conduct an in-depth investigation into the influence exerted by blockchain platforms in the supply chain, in response to carbon reduction challenges initiated by manufacturers. By introducing parameters such as the proportion of joint emission reduction investment costs and blockchain unit verification fees, we perform a comprehensive analysis of the effects produced by consumer sensitivity and blockchain platforms on sales prices, recycling prices, carbon emission reduction, market demand, amount of recycled, and profits under different emission reduction modes. Research has revealed that irrespective of whether the manufacturer adopts blockchain platforms, wholesale prices, retail prices, carbon emission reduction, market demand, manufacturer's profit in the joint emission reduction model are always higher than those in individual emission reduction model, while recycling prices and amount of recycled remain unchanged. With retailer's share of the carbon reduction investment cost kept within an appropriate range, both profits of retailer and supply chain increase under joint emission reduction model. When a manufacturer introduces blockchain technology platforms, unit verification fees only affect wholesale prices and have no impact on retail prices, recycling prices, carbon emission reduction, and profits.

To effectively balance emission reduction and preservation in the agricultural product sales system, this study models the carbon emission allocation of the agricultural product supply chain based on differential game theory. Starting from decentralized and centralized strategies without subsidies, research and modeling are conducted on the influencing factors of emission reduction, publicity, and preservation. Secondly, considering the scenario of government subsidies, the research analyzes the dynamic impact of different emission reduction, publicity, and preservation measures on the operation of the system. In the unsubsidized analysis model, the trajectory of goodwill shows variability, while the trajectory of freshness and emission reduction is mainly monotonic. In addition, freshness preference can enhance emission reduction decisions, and centralized strategies are superior to decentralized strategies in emission reduction. The increase in goodwill preference enhances the preservation, emission reduction, and sales status variables of agricultural products, but the centralized strategy is better than the decentralized strategy. Under the bilateral coordination mechanism, the maximum profit of the centralized strategy and bidirectional cost coordination mechanism system is 4350. In addition, under the two-way cost coordination mechanism, both retailers and suppliers have the highest profits, which are 1950 and 2352 respectively. In subsidy analysis, when the profit ratio is 0.5, the benefits of retailers and sellers reach equilibrium. In addition, bilateral coordination mechanisms have better system economic benefits, environmental benefits, and social welfare. This study is beneficial for improving carbon emissions from agricultural products and enhancing the effectiveness of agricultural product market development. This study provides technical support for agricultural emissions reduction and optimization of agricultural product supply chains.