With the rapid growth of e-commerce, platform-based financing in electronic business (EB) has emerged as an innovative solution for online retailers facing capital constraints. This study develops a Stackelberg game-theoretic framework to analyze strategic financing decisions in a two-tier e-commerce supply chain, where an electronic business platform (EBP) , as the leader, assumes leadership by setting financing interest rates, while a capital-constrained, loss-averse online retailer (LOR), as the follower, optimizes order quantities and financing participation under behavioral risk preferences. A hierarchical game-theoretic framework is established to examine strategic interactions between an EBP and a LOR, and the equilibrium outcomes are given. The model derives optimal decisions for both financing rates and ordering strategies. Results demonstrate that when the retailer's initial capital grows, their necessity for external financing diminishes correspondingly, leading to smaller order quantities due to reduced bankruptcy risk. Moreover, higher levels of loss aversion cause retailers to order less and avoid financing, reflecting risk-sensitive behavior. The study also presents comprehensive numerical analyses to explore additional managerial implications, offering insights into how capital availability and behavioral factors like loss aversion shape decision-making in EB financing environments.