Game-theoretic analysis of supply chain coordination under advertising and price dependent demand

Abstract: Supply chain members cannot act independently and they need to act as a part of a unified system and coordinated with other members. Therefore, a coordination mechanism may be necessary to motivate members to achieve coordination. In this paper, the coordination problem is studied in a two-level supply chain consisting of a supplier and a retailer where demand is a function of price and advertising expenditures in two scenarios. The first scenario is “No coordination”, and the other scenario is “coordination with Revenue sharing contract”. The models are solved using game theory, Cooperative and Nash equilibrium. Finally, numerical examples are presented indicating that the average expected profit in the second scenario, coordination with revenue sharing, is higher than the first scenario. In addition numerical examples indicate that as price and advertising elasticity to demand increase, profitability of supply chain decreases.

How to cite this paper

 Taheri, M., Ebrahimi, S & Khoshalhan, F. (2014). Game-theoretic analysis of supply chain coordination under advertising and price dependent demand.International Journal of Industrial Engineering Computations , 5(3), 395-406.

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